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DOES ALL THIS LITIGATION "REFORM"

REALLY BENEFIT THE CLIENT?
ROBERT L. HAIG*
WARREN N. STONE**
INTRODUCTION

Since it became law on December 1, 1990, the Civil Justice
Reform Act ("CJRA")1 has mandated an unprecedented nationwide effort to reform the handling of civil cases in the federal district courts. Under the CJRA, each of the nation's ninety-four district courts is directed to develop its own "civil justice expense and

delay reduction plan" to promote the more efficient resolution of
civil disputes. 2 Although it is too early to evaluate definitively
whether these plans will result in faster and less expensive federal civil litigation, there is no question that the CJRA has
spawned bold, continuing efforts across the nation that seek to
foster more efficient federal civil litigation.3
* Robert L. Haig is a Partner in the law firm of Kelley Drye & Warren in New
York City. His law practice includes commercial, personal injury, and other types of
civil litigation in Federal and New York State courts at both the trial and appellate
levels.
** Warren N. Stone is a Vice President and Senior Associate Counsel in the Liti-

gation Division of The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
I Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1993).
2 Id. § 471.
3 See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT.
FOR THE DIST. OF MoNT.(1992); CIviL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN,
U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E.DIST. OF CAL.(1991); REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT ADVISORY GROUP,U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF CAL. (1991); REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND PLAN PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990

U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE S. DIST. OF CAL.
(1991); THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION
ADOPTED BY THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT,

PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. AND BANKER. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF IDAHO (1991); CIVIL JUSTICE
DELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE S. DIST. OF ILL. (1991);
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE N. DIST.
OF IND. (1991); REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON THE REDUCTION OF COST AND DELAY IN CIVIL CASES, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE N. DIST. OF IND. (1991); CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE S. DIST. OF IND. (1991);

CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR
THE DIST. OF KAN. (1991); EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR
THE DIST. OF MASS. (1991); CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE
DIST. OF N.J. (1991); CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST.
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This Article considers whether the litigation reforms developed under the mandates of the CJRA will actually benefit clients.
The CJRA reforms seek to benefit various legitimate interests involved in the civil litigation process, such as the judiciary, the lawyers, the court system, the taxpayer, and the public.4 Accordingly,
the interests of clients are not the only interests to be considered
in formulating litigation reforms. Nevertheless, despite the legitimate interests of numerous parties, the proponents of the reforms
frequently focus on the benefits conferred on clients. 5 Additionally, any reforms which do not improve the operation of the litigation process for those who use it are, at least, highly suspect.
Thus, we examine these reforms from the perspective of the client,
which
but remain aware that there are other valid interests
6
should be considered in evaluating litigation reforms.
Proponents of the CJRA argue that the reforms will reduce
both the length of time required to resolve disputes and the cost of
litigation to clients. 7 Critics, however, argue that the reforms will
add to the delay and cost of litigation by creating new and uncer-

CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF N.Y. (1991) [hereinafter EDNY PLAN]; CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE W. DIST. OF OKLA. (1991); CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF OR.
(1991); CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN AND REPORT OF THE ADviSORY GROUP UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E.
DIST. OF PA. (1991); REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP, U.S.
DIST. CT. FOR THE W. DIST. OF TENN. (1991); CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF TEX. (1991); REPORT AND PLAN OF THE
ADVISORY GROUP, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. of V.I. (1991); REPORT OF THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF VA. (1991);
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP AND PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE S. DIST. OF W. VA.
(1991); CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE

DIST. OF WYO. (1991) [individual reports hereinafter CJRA REPORT, - DIST. OF -].
4 See S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6806 (explaining need to seek input from various groups when
developing plan).
5 See id. at 2-3, 12, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6804-05, 6814-15.
6 See id. at 4, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6806; see also EvaluatingProposals for Civil Justice Reform, 76 JUDICATURE 108, 108 (1992) (listing competing values

within justice system).
7 See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817
(stating that six principles of reform are aimed at reducing cost of litigation and
number of delays); see also Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal,Accessible, Affordable Justice
UnderLaw: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 1316 (1992) (describing attempt at national implementation of cost and delay reduction).
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tain rules that are sure to result in expensive and protracted satellite litigation.8
While it is too early to offer more than preliminary thoughts
as to whether the expense and delay reduction plans will achieve
their goals, 9 it is clear that these plans must be understood by
litigants and their counsel. For litigants to both benefit from and
take full advantage of the reforms, attorneys must develop an un-

derstanding of the methods that the plans employ to reduce expense and delay. If the CJRA reforms are thoughtfully applied by
courts and litigants to individual cases, it is likely that they can
help reduce the actual and perceived expense and delay about
which clients so often complain.
Part I of this Article examines the six principles and six techniques that the CJRA sets forth for the more efficient and less
costly resolution of civil litigation. Part II considers several provisions of the expense and delay reduction plans developed in the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York that are likely to
have a significant impact on clients. Part III suggests several
steps attorneys and clients may take to integrate the CJRA reforms into a system of litigation management to ensure that the
reforms enhance the efficient and economically rational resolution
of cases, instead of merely becoming additional steps in the already costly litigation process.

8 See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil
Procedure, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1393, 1422-27 (1992) (examining implications of complex
procedures in civil lawsuits under CJRA). According to Professor Tobias, the "nascent
implementation" of the CJRA "threaten[s] the continued viability of a uniform, simple
system of procedure." Id. at 1393; see D. Jeffrey Campbell & Jonathan R. Kuhlman,
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: An Experiment Gone Awry, 60 DEF. CoUNs. J. 17
(1993) (describing uncertainty sure to result from mandatory disclosure requirements); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin ProceduralJustice, 77 MiNN.
L. REv. 375, 438-40 (1992) (concluding that CJRA subverts proper rulemaking authority); Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil JusticeReform Act of 1990, LA-W &
CONTENIP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 105, 118 (acknowledging that success of CJRA
will depend on users of civil justice system); Dana B. Taschner & Robin L. Filion, The
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Historic Changes in Federal Civil Procedure
Aimed at Improving the Efficiency of Federal Courts and Reducing the Uncertainty
and Cost Associated with Federal Litigation, 23 HAw. Bus. J. 41 (1991) ("[T]he broad
scope of the Act will have far-reaching consequences for litigation in the federal courts
and will reduce much of the uncertainty, cost and delay associated with civil
litigation.").
9 A majority of the plans were adopted in the past two years. See supra note 3
(listing various plans and dates of adoption).
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A

CAUTIONARY

At the outset, it should be noted that the CJRA will not solve
some of the most significant problems causing delays in the handling of civil cases in the district courts. To a large extent, these
delays are the product of judicial vacancies 1 ° and the priority that
district courts are statutorily required to give to criminal cases. 1
For instance, in the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction
Plan adopted by the Board of Judges of the Southern District of
New York on December 12, 1991, the court noted that any delay in
civil cases appears to be attributable to the large number of judicial vacancies and the priority criminal cases must receive under
12
the Speedy Trial Act.
In addition to judicial vacancies, the statutorily authorized
number of judges in some districts has been insufficient to handle
10 See Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 76 JUDICATURE
185 (1993) (discussing factors contributing to judicial gridlock). Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests that the insufficient number of federal judges and the disturbing
amount of vacancies will result in the downfall of the federal system as a whole. See
Linda Greenhouse, Ease Load on Courts, Rehnquist Urges, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 1, 1992,
§ 1, at 8; William Rehnquist, The Supreme Court and Society, Rehnquist's Reducing
Plan, THE RECORDER, Jan. 21, 1992, at 9 (excerpt from Rehnquist's 1991 year-end
report on federal judiciary). In New York, there are currently eight vacancies in the
28-judge Southern District, three in the 15-judge Eastern District, and three in the
13-judge United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Southern District
Chief Judge Thomas P. Griesa believes that this drastic shortage creates an "absolute
emergency." Deborah Pines, Swift Action on Judges Promised, N.Y. L.J., June 28,
1993, at 1.
11 Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988 & Supp. 1992); see Mullenix, supra note 8, at 401-02 (noting that, in many districts, main reason for civil
docket backlog is Speedy Trial Act).
12 See CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR
THE S. DIST. OF N.Y. 2 (1991) [hereinafter SDNY PLAN]. The need for alternative dispute resolution is even more apparent given statistical data reporting that the total
number of cases filed in federal courts climbed from 33,591 in 1938 to 217,879 in
1990, the total number of civil filings increased from 207 per judgeship in 1955 to 448
per judgeship in 1990, and the median length of time from joinder of issue to trial
increased from 9.1 months in 1955 to 14 months in 1990. See Kim Dayton, The Myth
of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REV. 889, 889-90
(1991); see also William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of Federal
Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1, 2 (commenting on current burdens on federal judiciary).
But see Stephen Daniels, Are Caseloads Really Increasing? Not Necessarily . .. ,
JUDGES' J., Summer 1986, at 34, 37-38 (concluding that litigation has not increased
generally, rather in only certain types of cases); Jack Weinstein, After Fifty Years of
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure:Are the Barriersto Justice Being Raised?, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1901, 1909 (1989) (arguing that litigation explosion is "wrong as a matter
of fact").
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dockets lengthened by the growth of certain types of federal litigation,1 3 such as complex racketeering trials and the prosecution of
the "war on drugs."' 4 Although the insufficient number of authorized judgeships has been remedied to some extent by the Federal
Judgeship Act of 1990,1 which created 85 new judgeships,"6 additional judgeships are still needed. No procedural reforms, however well-conceived and executed, can overcome delays created by
a shortage of judges and the excessive caseloads burdening the
current bench.
I.

THE CJRA's PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES FOR EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION

The CJRA sets forth six principles and six techniques of litigation management to guide the district courts in developing their
expense and delay reduction plans. 7 Although each of the district
courts has discretion to develop an expense and delay reduction
plan that addresses the individual needs of the district,' 8 all districts are encouraged to at least consider, if not adopt, these principles and techniques.' 9 When thoughtfully applied, these principles and techniques generally offer sound opportunities for
expense and delay reduction.
Section 473(a) of the CJRA sets forth the six principles that
Congress directed all districts to consider when developing their
own expense and delay reduction plans.2 ° While these principles
should be considered by each of the districts when fashioning their
plans, the plans of the ten pilot districts must actually implement
these principles. 21 The six principles are: (1) differential manage13 See, e.g., CJRA REPORT, E. DIST. OF CAL., supra note 3, at 18-33; CJRA REPORT,
N. DisT. OF IND., supra note 3, at 3-30; CJRA REPORT, E. DisT. OF PA., supra note 3, at
13-22; CJRA REPORT, DisT. OF V.I., supra note 3, at 4-7; CJRA REPORT, E. DisT. OF
VA., supra note 3, at 2-15, 28-48.
14 Williams, supra note 10, at 185 (noting that number of drug prosecutions have
tripled in last decade).
15 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
16 Id.
17 See 28 U.S.C. § 473; see also S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 14-30, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817-33 (discussing principles of plan).
18 See 28 U.S.C. § 472.
19 See id. § 473(a),(b).
20 See id. § 473(a).
21 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 471 ch. 23, at 765-67 (West 1993). The Judicial Conference of
the United States designated ten pilot districts which are required to develop cost and
delay plans that incorporate all six of the principles enumerated in § 473. Id. at 767.
These plans are to remain in effect for at least three years. Id. The ten pilot districts
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ment of cases depending on their complexity and the time needed
to prepare for trial,2 2 (2) early judicial intervention in cases, including the early setting of firm trial dates, which should typically
be within eighteen months of the filing of the complaint,2 3 (3) case
management conferences that establish the scope of, and timing
for, needed discovery,2 4 (4) voluntary and cooperative methods of
discovery,2 5 (5) certification by counsel that a discovery motion is
made only after good faith efforts have failed to resolve the discovery dispute,2 6 and (6) active encouragement of alternative dispute
resolution.
Section 473(b) of the CJRA sets forth six techniques that each
district court should consider using as tools for expense and delay
reduction.28 Similar to the principles, none of the federal districts
is required to implement these techniques, but should consider
them when fashioning plans for expense and delay reduction.2 9
The six techniques are: (1) preparation of a discovery management
plan by counsel for all parties at the initial pretrial conference,3 0
(2) presence at pretrial conferences of counsel with authority to
bind the parties on any matters identified for discussion by the
court,3 1 (3) signatures of both counsel and client on any requests
for extensions of discovery deadlines and postponements of trial
dates, 32 (4) submission to a neutral court representative for a nonare: Southern District of California, District of Delaware, Northern District of Georgia, Southern District of New York, Western District of Oklahoma, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Western District of Tennessee, Southern District of Texas, District of
Utah, and Eastern District of Wisconsin. JUDICIL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS BY

EARLY IMPLEMENTATION DISTRICTS AND PILOT COURTS 1 (June 1, 1992). All of the 94
district courts must issue plans by December 1993. 28 U.S.C.A_ § 471, ch. 23, at 766.
Thirty-four districts, including the Eastern District of New York, developed plans by
December 31, 1991. See id. Those disticts are designated early implementation districts, which entitles them to additional funding, equipment, and personnel to aid in
implementing their plans. See id.
22 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(1).
23 Id. § 473(a)(2).
24 Id. § 473(a)(3).
25 Id. § 473(a)(4).
26 Id. § 473(a)(5).
27 Id. § 473(a)(6).
28 Id. § 473(b).
29
30

Id.
Id. § 473(b)(1).

31 Id. § 473(b)(2).
32 Id. § 473(b)(3). While the "technique" requiring both counsel and client to sign
requests for extensions of discovery and postponements of trial dates may be wellintentioned, see id., we question the wisdom of such a technique. Obviously, counsel
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binding evaluation of the case, 33 (5) requirement that parties or
their representatives be available for binding settlement discussions upon notice by the court,34 and (6) authorization for each
district to adopt other techniques that the district shall consider
appropriate in view of the recommendations of the district's advisory group. 5
For the most part, it is difficult to argue with the logic of the
principles and techniques of the CJRA. The overriding goal of
both the principles and techniques appears to be fostering litigation that is closely managed by the court and cooperative in spirit
among the parties. The principles and techniques offer common
sense approaches to minimize expense and delay. While these
principles and techniques do impose some additional duties on
courts and litigants, they appear reasonably calculated to achieve
their goals. Thus, assuming a client's objective in a case is the
prompt and efficient adjudication of the issues being litigated, clients should benefit from expense and delay reduction plans that
conscientiously integrate the CJRA's principles and techniques.
We believe that four aspects of the principles and techniques
are likely to have particularly significant impacts on clients.
These are: (1) the use of case management conferences and plans
to ensure close judicial control of all phases of a litigation,R (2) the
early establishment of a firm trial date, (3) the use of voluntary
methods of discovery, 38 and (4) the active encouragement of settle3 9
ment discussions and methods of alternative dispute resolution.
We discuss each of these matters below.
should discuss such matters with the client. Failure to do so may indicate that the
attorney-client relationship is not open and may be symptomatic of more serious attorney-client difficulties. Nonetheless, the need for joint signatures is likely to impose
logistical burdens on both attorney and client, particularly when confronted with
deadlines. If the court believes that counsel is requesting extensions which are
neither authorized by the client nor in the client's best interests, the court has always
had the power to deal with such situations (by directing counsel to communicate with
the client or to bring the client into court) without requiringjointly signed documents
in all cases.
33 Id. § 473(b)(4).
34 Id. § 473(b)(5).
35 Id. § 473(b)(6).
36 Id. § 473(a)(3).
37 Id. § 473(a)(2)(B).
38 Id. § 473(a)(4).
39 Id. § 473(a)(6).
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Case Management Conferences and Case Management Plans

Case management plans, which are already widely used by
many courts pursuant to Federal Rule 16,40 can be utilized by the
court and litigants to develop an appropriate schedule for all aspects of litigation from the earliest stages of a case. Active judicial
management of the case should increase the likelihood that the
litigation will proceed in a constructive and expeditious manner.
By conducting a case management conference that addresses,
among other things, the types of issues set forth in Rule 16, the
court can help focus pretrial preparation and ensure that discovery is properly tailored to the needs of the case. 4 '
Two of the techniques set forth in the CJRA seem especially
well calculated to ensure that case management conferences are
effective tools for expense and delay reduction. First, the preparation and submission of a joint discovery management plan requires that the parties themselves agree on and submit a discovery program to the court.4 2 If the parties are able to jointly
develop such a plan, it is likely that the plan will reflect their mutual assessment as to appropriate discovery for the case, and a
realistic timetable to accomplish their goals.
Second, the requirement that counsel at pretrial conferences
have authority to bind the parties as to any issue identified by the
court 4 3 helps ensure that pretrial conferences will be meaningful.
While the notion that counsel must have authority to bind clients
at conferences with the court is hardly a new concept, 44 the adoption of this rule should ensure that pretrial conferences will not be
hindered by counsel's lack of authority. A caveat to the foregoing
is, however, that issues on which the parties are to be bound
should be identified in advance. Courts cannot fairly expect parties and their counsel to have discussed and arrived at positions
on all issues which might conceivably arise at a pretrial conference. In addition, it would be inefficient and unduly expensive
and burdensome to require parties and their counsel to discuss a
See FED. R. Crv. P. 16.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(2) (setting forth objectives and goals of rule).
28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(1).
Id. § 473(b)(2).
See generally Shirley H. Buccieri & Trygve Thoreson, Legal Ethics: Issues and
Rules of ProfessionalResponsibility, in SiXTH ANNuAL INsTrrUTE ON CoRPoRATE LAw
DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT, at 796 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 265, 1992), available in WESTLAW, JLR Database (discussing attorney-client relationship and attorney's ability to bind client).
40
41
42
43
44
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large number of issues in advance of each pretrial conference just
in case the issues might be mentioned at the conference. Thus,
the fair way to use this technique is to require counsel at pretrial
conferences to have authority to bind the parties only as to issues
identified as being in need of resolution in advance of the conference. Absent such advance notice, courts should permit counsel a
reasonable opportunity to communicate with their clients about
the matters on which the clients are to be bound.
Although some critics argue that the type of systematic and
continuous case management contemplated by the CJRA places
additional burdens on an already overburdened federal judiciary, 45 the careful management of cases should ultimately reduce
judicial workloads. For instance, the development of a comprehensive and realistic case management plan may reduce the need
for later judicial resolution of scheduling disputes. Judges may
utilize case management conferences to resolve discovery disputes
that could otherwise lead to needless motions, and to resolve some
substantive issues, such as joinder of parties, without the need for
motion practice. Moreover, by encouraging the differential management of cases, the CJRA should help ensure that the type of
close judicial supervision contemplated by case management conferences does not place burdens on the court that outweigh the
expected benefits. Clearly, the number and complexity of case
management conferences needed for a particular case will vary depending on the nature of the case. A complex multi-defendant securities fraud case will typically require more judicial supervision
than a simple breach of contract case involving two parties.
Although courts have followed the practice of tracking cases
differently for years, the CJRA explicitly encourages the development of systems to track different types of cases. 46 As shown in
Part II below, individual district courts are free to develop methods of differential case management that account for the needs of
the particular district.4 7 To the extent that plans for differential
45 See, e.g., The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the JudicialImprovements
Act of 1990:HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,101st Cong., 2d Sess.
210-13 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings](testimony of Judge Aubrey E. Robinson) (pointing to criminal docket, judicial vacancies, and need for new judgeships as factors burdening judiciary); Tobias, supra note 8, at 1395-97, 1402-03 (suggesting that CJRA
will "enhance, and even may eclipse" existing problems faced by judiciary).
46 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1).
47 The districts vary substantially in the specific number of particular types of
cases which they must adjudicate. For example, a district containing several large
prisons will have more habeas corpus cases than a district with no prisons. Although
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case management are left to the individual districts, each district
can develop an approach
to case management conferences that
48
needs.
its
serves
best
If case management conferences are used by courts and litigants to focus the issues and activity in a case, the conferences
will prove useful. At a conference, the court may enter a scheduling order that indicates the schedule by which amendment of
pleadings, joinder of parties, motions, and discovery must be
completed.
From the client's perspective, it is generally desirable that the
individual judge determine the use to be made of case management conferences and plans. To a judge who has not made active
use of case management conferences and plans in the past and is
opposed to doing so, it is unlikely the conferences and plans will
prove useful. Instead, they will likely become merely perfunctory
steps that cost litigants more time and expense than they are
worth. To the extent individual judges have developed different
approaches to case management that they choose not to discard,
the CJRA reforms should not be permitted to become counter productive "make work" for the court, counsel, or litigants.
B.

The Setting of Firm Trial Dates

The establishment of a firm trial date at an early stage of the
litigation is an important provision of the CJRA. 49 By scheduling
a firm trial date soon after a case commences, the court and litiit may not be necessary to allocate a separate case management category specifically

to habeas corpus cases, at the very least, those cases should not be placed in the same
category as a highly complex securities case or RICO litigation.
48 Potentially, the development of different plans by all 94 districts may burden
counsel and clients who will have to familiarize themselves with a host of procedural
rules evolving from different expense and delay reduction plans in various districts.
See Tobias, supra note 8, at 1422-24. This is a burden resulting from the substantial

autonomy necessary for each district to develop a meaningful plan which suits the
particular needs of the district. This burden is further increased by the revisions expected to result from the success or failure of the early use of the plans. On balance,
however, it is expected, or at least hoped, that the plans will prove sufficiently helpful
to warrant this burden. In any event, permitting local autonomy is politically astute
because it increases the likelihood that individual districts will support, rather than
resist, these reforms and will develop a commitment to the individual plans they
worked to develop. But see id. at 1426-27 (citing district judge who criticizes CJRA as
encouraging district shopping). Professor Tobias further suggests that "[c]itizens lose
respect for the civil justice system when they believe that the procedures available, or
the character of justice, vary significantly from district to district." Id. at 1427.
49 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2)(B).
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gants are compelled to develop a realistic and presumably prompt
timetable for completion of the pretrial phase.
Because the trial date will typically be set for eighteen
months after the date the complaint is ffled,5 0 litigants will be required to prosecute their claims and prepare their defenses in a
timely and expeditious manner. In view of the tendency to expand
work to fill whatever time is available to complete the litigation, a
compressed litigation timetable will probably result in more efficient preparation for trial. The fact that a case must routinely be
prepared for trial in eighteen months may help reduce the many
"fits and starts" that can so often cause litigation costs to soar. A
compressed timetable may force the parties to address and efficiently resolve important issues, such as amendment of pleadings
and joinder of additional parties, that are often deferred until
later in the case. At this later date, resolution of these issues may
lead to further inefficiencies and delay because of the need to conduct additional discovery.
For the most part, if litigation moves at a faster pace, it will
probably be less expensive. Pressure to keep the case moving may
force the parties to be more selective when choosing the discovery
that they seek and forego discovery that is of marginal significance to the case. 51 As a practical matter, the compressed timetable may help reduce the potential costs to a client that are so often
caused by turnover of the lawyers handling a case.
It is important from the client's perspective that courts adhere to the trial dates that they have established. We recognize
that judges have many different responsibilities which frequently
conflict and impose intolerable burdens. For example, district
courts are statutorily required to give priority to criminal cases,
thus wreaking havoc with the scheduling and completion of civil
trials,5 2 and potentially increasing one of the largest litigation expenses for clients, the final preparation for trial. All too frequently, clients and their counsel prepare fully for trial only to
find at the last moment that an adjournment is necessary. Inevitably, both clients and counsel are either required, or at least feel
50 SDNY PLAN,supra note 12, at 4.
51 See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 24-25, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6827-28.
52 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174; see also Charles B. Renfrew, The Problem of
Docket Control: A Response to "Reassessingthe Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts," 78 VA. L. REv.1833, 1837 (1992) (commenting on
speedy trial requirement and impact on court dockets).
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compelled, to repeat much of the same effort when preparing for
the next trial date. Adhering to trial dates whenever possible
helps alleviate these expensive problems.
While it is conceivable that the establishment of a firm trial
date at an early stage of a case may sometimes force litigants to
proceed in ways which they may not otherwise choose, the benefits
of an early trial date probably outweigh any disadvantages. The
establishment of a trial date may help ensure that discovery and
motion practice do not take on lives of their own. Notwithstanding the real benefit to be gained by a compressed litigation timetable, the court should, under any plan, have discretion to control
the case in whatever manner and on whatever timetable the court
deems appropriate in view of the needs of the litigants.
Obviously, there are many instances in which the court and
parties may be well served by a slower timetable. For instance, if
there are genuine and active settlement discussions taking place
from the outset of a case, the court may decide to give the parties
time to continue their discussions without the pressure and expense of discovery deadlines or a trial date. If all of the parties are
willing to accept this delay, then presumably the court should not
object to it. To force both the court and the litigants to address the
merits of the case when settlement discussions are proceeding can
prove to be a waste of time if the case settles, and may even impede the ongoing settlement discussions if the discovery process
causes the development of a more adversarial relationship among
the parties. Similarly, where a case may have been brought primarily to avoid a statute of limitations bar, the judge should be
able to control the timetable in any manner that is appropriate.
Finally, a complex case that will actually take longer to prepare
for trial than the eighteen months targeted in the CJRA should
not be compressed into an unrealistic timetable.
C. Voluntary Discovery
One of the most controversial principles of the CJRA is the
encouragement of voluntary discovery.53 Although the CJRA does
53 CJRA § 473(a)(4) requires each district to encourage more "cost-effective discovery through [the] voluntary exchange of information among litigants and their attorneys and through the use of cooperative discovery devices." 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4);
see FinalReport of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal JudicialCircuit,
143 F.R.D. 441, 445-46 (1992) ("'Rambo'-style discovery can hinder or prevent litigation parties from getting to the heart of the important contested issues."); Mary Brigid
McManamon, Is the Recent Frenzy of Civil Justice Reform a Cure-All or a Placebo?An
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not detail the nature of the voluntary discovery to be used,5 4 the
inclusion of this principle appears to be a response to the widespread perception that discovery is excessive in American litigation.55 Evidently believing that some of the expense and delay of
discovery can be reduced by each litigant's automatic disclosure of
some information without a formal request, the CJRA drafters directed district courts to consider this concept when fashioning
their plans.5"
The issue of voluntary discovery is perhaps the most difficult
one raised by the CJRA. Because this idea is contrary to the discovery process that has evolved in our adversarial system, it is

difficult to anticipate how voluntary discovery will work.5

Many

critics of the CJRA argue that voluntary discovery will undermine
some of the benefits of the adversarial system, increase the burden of discovery, and result in even more discovery disputes
among counsel who may differ as to what documents must be voluntarily produced.5 8 Some critics have also argued that some ex-

Examinationof the Plans of Two PilotDistricts,11 REv. LrrG. 329, 352 (1991) (noting
District of Delaware recommendation that certain information be provided with initial pleading in personal injury cases). Each court must consider, and may adopt, the
11 principles, guidelines, and techniques, 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) and "such other features as the district court considers appropriate." Id. § 473(b)(6).
54 See McManamon, supra note 53, at 335. While the Act contains several guidelines and techniques of litigation management for the courts and their advisory
groups to consider, districts are divided in their support of the requirement of voluntary discovery. Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D.
139, 144-45 (1993) (discussing differences in plans).
55 See Jeffrey J. Mayer, PrescribingCooperation: The Mandatory PretrialDisclosure Requirement of ProposedRules 26 and 37 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
12 REv. Lrria. 77, 83-91 (1992) (analyzing discovery abuse and excessive use in litigation). A survey of litigators and federal trial judges revealed that a substantial majority of those surveyed perceived that abuse of the discovery process was the cause of
high litigation costs. See Peck, supra note 8, at 107-08. The most frequently cited
abuses were the "over-discovery" of cases and "the use of discovery as an adversarial
tool to raise the stakes for their opponents." Id.; see S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at
25, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6824 ("[D]iscovery costs constitute a higher percentage of total transaction costs than any other category of costs incurred."); Griffin
B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosurein Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV.
1, 8-11 (1992) (noting criticisms of discovery system).
56 See supra note 53-54; infra note 58-60 and accompanying text (noting controversy surrounding automatic disclosure requirement); Tobias, supra note 54, at 144.
57 See Mayer, supra note 55, at 91-95 (comparing mandatory disclosure and discovery systems).
58 See Bell et al., supra note 55, at 5, 30 n.111 (asserting that "voluntary disclosure" will not reduce cost of litigation).
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pense and delay reduction plans have adopted voluntary disclosure provisions that are contrary to Federal Rules 16 and 26.19
Each of these criticisms has a measure of validity. To the extent counsel must voluntarily produce documents that may hurt a
client's case, voluntary discovery may undermine the attorney-client relationship and lead clients to screen the documents they
give to counsel. Further, because many cases terminate before the
parties commence discovery, the imposition of automatic timetables for document disclosure may force parties to undertake discovery that would otherwise be unnecessary. To the extent that
counsel acting in good faith have different understandings of what
documents must be produced, the voluntary disclosure rules could
lead to costly and lengthy disputes. Moreover, some districts may
require parties to produce documents which support the pleadings, perhaps encouraging counsel to draft pleadings vaguely so as
to avoid production or to obfuscate the use which counsel intends
to make of the documents at trial.
These genuine concerns should be addressed on a case-bycase basis. However, it may prove both economical and efficient in
many cases for litigants to be required, shortly after commencement of a case, to exchange certain basic information, such as the
names and addresses of principal witnesses, the existence of material agreements signed by the parties, or the existence of any relevant insurance policies. Voluntary disclosure regarding basic information and documents raises relatively few troubling questions
because competent counsel will routinely request this information
during the early stages of a case.
We believe, however, that the broader use of voluntary discovery should be undertaken cautiously and on a trial basis. Disclosure rules that require production of all documents that tend to
support the allegations in a pleading may be so broad as to invite
many disputes as to which documents must be produced. Efforts
should be made by the districts to avoid uncertainty in this area
by defining the categories of documents to be produced as clearly
as possible.

59 See Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49, 51
(1992); FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26. But see S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 55, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6844. According to the Senate Report, § 473(a)(2)(C) "is intended to supplement the authority to limit discovery currently provided" for by Rule
26. Id.
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As set forth in subpart II(B) below, both the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York have initiated programs of voluntary discovery that bear scrutiny.60 However, any meaningful assessment of whether the benefits of these voluntary disclosure
plans will outweigh the difficulties inherent in voluntary discovery is premature. Moreover, under any expense and delay reduction plan, litigants and the court should be able to dispense with
such voluntary disclosure if it is deemed inappropriate. 6
D. Settlement and Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR")
The emphasis in the CJRA on settlement opportunities 6 2 and
63
encouragement of methods of alternative dispute resolution
should be especially welcomed by clients. If the principles and
techniques of the CJRA foster opportunities for settlement discussion, then litigants are more likely to maintain a dialogue. While
such discussions will not result in the settlement of all cases, and
may even harden positions, the explicit discussion of settlement
options can prove beneficial to clients in many cases.
One of the greatest impediments to the commencement of
meaningful settlement discussions in many cases is the concern
that the party initiating the discussion will be perceived as weak,
uncertain about the outcome, or lacking in resources or commitment to try the case. As a result, the parties in many cases engage in an elaborate game of posturing when they really should be
confronting the issue of settlement. Any reforms which compel
parties to discuss settlement sooner and more frequently should
improve the current situation.
Two of the techniques set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 473(b), the
early, neutral evaluation of cases 64 and the requirement that law60 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 4-5; SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 2. The Eastern and Southern Districts' provisions for automatic disclosure prior to discovery require an additional layer of procedure. See George F. Hritz, Plan Will Increase Cost,
Delay Outcomes, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 13, 1993, at 2. Critics argue that this layer comes too
early in a case, increases cost and delay, generates additional motion practice, and
encourages procedural gamesmanship and forum shopping. Id.
61 See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 53, 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6844-45 (suggesting that principles of litigation management are intended to be "flexible"). Section 473(a)(3) "requires careful and deliberate monitoring, through a discovery-case management conference or series of conferences, of all cases that the court
... determines are complex... or appropriate." Id. at 55.
62 See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(2), (4), and (5) (Supp. 1992) (describing settlement opportunities that districts must consider in adopting their plans).
63 Id. § 473(a)(6).
64 Id. § 473(b)(4).
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yers with the power to bind the parties be present at settlement
conferences, 65 seem well calculated to promote settlements.
A neutral evaluation allows litigants to learn from a knowledgeable and disinterested evaluator how the case may later be
perceived by the actual trier of fact. Even though such a nonbinding evaluation is not conclusive and can be ignored by the parties,
it should serve as a reality check for counsel and client and help
the client assess the worth of the case. In essence, the neutral
evaluation acts to give clients a different perspective of the litigation so that they can objectively consider how the facts will be
evaluated at trial. This may lead to revisions of trial expectations
or settlement offers and demands. It should be noted, however,
that the neutral evaluation effort may be quite involved and expensive depending on the nature of the presentations to the
evaluator.
The CJRA principles and techniques seek to foster cooperation among counsel, such as the joint preparation of a discovery
plan 66 and voluntary disclosure of some information.6 7 A good
working relationship among counsel will almost certainly promote
more meaningful settlement discussions in appropriate cases.
Not only the the early evaluation of cases, but also requiring
the presence or availability of representatives of the parties with
authority to bind them in settlement discussions is designed to
promote settlement. Although we agree that it is reasonable to
require attorneys with settlement authority to be present upon
proper notice, we do not believe that courts should routinely require the parties themselves to attend these conferences. While
some settlements may result if the parties are required to meet
The centerpiece of [early neutral evaluation] is a confidential, nonbinding
case evaluation conference, attended by all counsel and their clients, and
hosted by a neutral member of the private bar who has substantial litigation
experience and who is an expert in the principal subject matter of the lawsuit. This conference takes place early in the pretrial period so that the parties will be in a position to use.., the proceeding to make case development
and settlement processes more rational, less expensive and less timeconsuming.
See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 29-30, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 683233.
65 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(5). The CJRA describes this technique as "a requirement
that, upon notice by the court, representatives of the parties with authority to bind
them in settlement discussions be present or available by telephone during any settlement conference . . . ." Id.
66 Id. § 473(b)(1).
67 Id. § 473(a)(4).
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with the judge, in the majority of cases such attendance is burdensome and unnecessary. Further, by requiring the attendance of
parties, the court communicates to clients that it does not trust
their counsel to conduct settlement discussions fairly and competently. In most cases, this message is inappropriate.
The CJRA's focus on and encouragement of the many available ADR methods should also prove useful to clients. In almost
all cases, clients should at least consider the use of ADR in order
to reach a faster and more economical resolution of a dispute.6s
Several well-regarded private adjudication firms offer litigants
the opportunity for competent, nonjudicial resolution of disputes,
often by respected former judges.6 9 Guided by ADR experts, the
parties can then devise virtually any approach to settlement or
adjudication that they deem appropriate.° Currently, ADR is
moving toward the forefront of American dispute resolution, and
attorneys should advise their clients to consider its benefits.7
II.

EXPENSE

AND DELAY REDUCTION IN TEE SOUTHERN AND
EASTERN DIsTRIcTs OF NEW YoRK

Both the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York have
adopted expense and delay reduction plans that may offer sub7
The Southern District of New York
stantial benefits to clients2.
is one of the ten pilot districts designated by the Judicial Conference of the United States; 73 the Eastern District of New York has
68 See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat.
2736 (1990). The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which expires on October 1,
1995, id. § 6(a), § 606(e), requires every federal agency to develop ADR policies, id.
§ 3(a), authorizes the use of ADR by federal agencies, id., and requires agency training in ADR methods. Id. § 3(c). In addition, the Act authorizes agencies to consider
the inclusion of ADR provisions in their standard contracts. Id. § 3(d)(1); see Anne C.
Morgan, Note, Thwarting JudicialPower to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal
District Court: Strandell v. Jackson County, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 491, 492-96
(1990). Federal district court judges increasingly utilize alternative dispute resolution techniques to reduce delay and clear congested dockets. Id.; see S. REP. No. 416,
supra note 4, at 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6830-34 (supporting use of
summary jury trial, mediation, mini-trial, and early neutral evaluation). But see Dayton, supra note 12, at 915 (asserting that claims concerning ADR's potential to reduce
costs and delays are greatly exaggerated).
69 Lis Wiehl, PrivateJusticefor a Fee: Profits and Problems,N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 17,
1989, at B5.
70 See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 27-28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6830-31.
71 See McManamon, supra note 53, at 329; supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3; SDNY PLAN, supra note 12.
73 See supra note 21 (listing pilot districts).
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opted to become an Early Implementation District.7 4 We have focused on these two plans for a number of reasons. Although they
differ in many respects, 7 5 both plans contain provisions that may
promote economical and prompt resolution of disputes.7 6 In addition, both plans evince a bold willingness to experiment to improve the litigation process. Both plans reflect the extensive time,
effort, and thought devoted to them by their distinguished authors. Finally, these two are extraordinarily busy and district
courts handle a wide variety of cases.7 7 Accordingly, reforms
which are successful in these districts should have a fair chance of
success in other districts.
The plans for the Southern District of New York ("SDNY
Plan") and Eastern District of New York ("EDNY Plan") recognize
that CJRA expense and delay reduction plans should not limit judicial discretion in the management of cases.7 The Guide to the
Southern Districtof New York Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan ("SDNY Guide") expressly states that "neither this
Guide nor the Plan vests any additional rights in lawyers or litigants; final discretion as to the matters discussed here remains
with the individual judge."79 Similarly, the EDNY Plan states
that "[flor cause shown, any judicial officer may in any case modify or suspend the operation of any one or more or all of the provi80
sions of this Plan."

74 See Tobias, supra note 59, at 56.
75 See Gerard P. Lepp, Arbitration in Federal Courts, Eastern District of New
York, in How TO HANDLE ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, at
49 (PLI Litig. and Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 458, 1993) available

in WESTLAW, JLR Database (comparing alternative dispute resolution programs of
two plans).
76 See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 25, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6828. Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, noted the evils

the CJRA attempts to remedy: "High costs and excessive delay do combine to forestall
the deliberate and prompt adjudication of disputes. And they do combine to ration
commodities that a democracy should never ration-fairness, justice, and access to
the courts." Id. at 8.

E. DIsT. OF N.Y., FINAL
142 F.R.D. 185, 228-33 (1991) (detailing growth and burdens of complex litigation in Eastern District) [hereinafter
77 See ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIsT. CT. FOR THE

REPORT TO HON. THOMAS C. PLATT, CHIEF JUDGE,

EDNY FINAL REPORT].
78 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 1; SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 4.
79 GUIDE TO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YoRK CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 1 (1993) [hereinafter SDNY GUIDE].

80 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 1.
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There is little question that judges should be able to control a
case as they deem appropriate. 8 ' If a judge believes a provision of
the plan should not apply to a particular case, the judge should
have the discretion to deviate from the plan. By permitting the
exercise of sound judicial discretion, both the Southern and Eastern District plans undercut some of the strongest fears initially
expressed concerning the CJRA: (1) that it would transform the
complex and intellectually demanding litigation process into a
factory assembly line; and (2) that it would require judges preparing cases for trial to act as technicians applying mechanistic
"cookie cutter" procedures rather than as sophisticated litigation
managers. 2
Although a complete review of the SDNY Plan and the EDNY
Plan is beyond the scope of this Article, we have focused on various aspects of the plans that have potential significance to clients.
These provisions pertain to: (1) differential case management,
case management conferences, and the establishment of trial
84
dates; 83 (2) automatic disclosure and limitations on discovery;
(3) motion practice;" and (4) use of ADR.8 6 An understanding of
how the two plans approach these areas should aid clients during
litigation. Although there may be some features of each plan that
clients will dislike, or about which judgment should be reserved

81 See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
in SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL CvIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 1990-91
LEGISLATrVE AND RULE-MAKING CHANGES

167 (ALI-ABA Video Law Review Study,

1991), available in WESTLAW, JLR Database (detailing memorandum sent to all
chief judges of United States district courts as assistance in implementation of
CJRA). The Federal Judicial Center notes that differential case management, as espoused by the CJRA, "is characterized by flexibility and necessarily involves the exercise of judicial discretion in its implementation." Id. at 182.
82 See Robert L. Haig, JudicialVacanciesand ProceduralReform, N.Y. L.J., June
15, 1992, at 2 (noting that judges and lawyers are likely to object to loss of flexibility
which may result from new procedures); see also Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating
Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure:Is It Again Time for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155,
165 (1991). Mengler states that "[a] sounder approach... is to put down the rule
making pen and to provide the necessary resources to manage formal discovery effectively." Id. He suggests abolishing diversity jurisdiction and providing additional Article Ill and magistrate judges. Id.
83 See infra subpart H(A).
84 See infra subpart 11(B).
85 See infra subpart II(0).
86 See infra subpart H(D).
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until the operation of the plan is clarified, each plan contains fea7
tures that should reduce the cost and delay of civil litigation.1
A.

Differential Case Management, Case Management
Conferences, and the Establishment of Trial Dates

The SDNY Plan and the EDNY Plan adopt different approaches to differential case management and case management
conferences.8 " While the Southern District created a differential
case management system based upon the level of the complexity of
a case,8 9 the Eastern District declined to adopt a formal system of
differential case management. Instead, the Eastern District opted
to retain, without revision, its present system. 90 Under the SDNY
Plan, each case is designated as expedited, standard, or complex
depending on the complexity of the legal and factual issues in the
case. 9 1 If the parties cannot agree on a designation, the designation is made by the judge based on Case Information Statements
filed by the parties or following discussion during the initial case
management conference.9 2 The SDNY Guide states that there
should be no motion practice concerning these categories and
urges judges not to develop a jurisprudence concerning these
classifications. 93
An expedited case is a case involving no more than two depositions by each party, a relatively small number of clear-cut documents, little anticipated use of interrogatories, and little or no motion practice.9 4 An expedited case should be ready for trial no
later than one year after the answer is filed and should require
little judicial supervision of pretrial activity.95 A standard case is
one that the parties do not believe can be tried within a year, but
that does not involve an unusually large number of parties, complex issues, or a large number of anticipated discovery disputes or
87 See Carl Tobias, Speeding Cases, Slowing Justice, THE RECORDER, Aug. 4,
1992, at 7 ("Indeed, a number of specific procedures promise to reduce expense and
delay in civil litigation."). However, when examining expense and delay reduction
plans, Tobias also warns that "many provisions in the plans could have the opposite
effects, increasing costs and delaying rather than speeding the process ofjustice." Id.
88 See infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
89 See SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 2.
90 See EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 2.
91 See SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 2.
92 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 2-4.
93 SDNY GuxDE, supra note 79, at 1.
94 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 2.
95 SDNY GuiDE, supra note 79, at 2.

1993]

LITIGATION "REFORM"

motions. 96 A complex case is one involving a more complex procedural structure, a large number of parties, difficult substantive
claims, a broad range of discovery, and the likelihood of a number
of pretrial motions.97 For cases that are designated as standard or
complex, trials are generally to be set no later than eighteen
months after filing of the complaint.98
Although the EDNY Plan does not adopt a formal system of
differential case management for all cases, 99 as does the SDNY
Plan, the Eastern District continues its differential management
of social security and habeas corpus cases and its special treatment rules for complex cases.' 0 0 The EDNY Plan also continues a
program of mandatory, nonbinding arbitration for all claims for
money damages involving $100,000 or less except those involving
social security, tax matters, prisoner's rights, and constitutional
rights. 10 1 The EDNY Plan expressly leaves the setting of trial
dates to the discretion of the judicial officer and declines to set
specific target dates for trial.' 02
Clients with smaller claims brought in either district may especially benefit from the plans. The SDNY Plan demonstrates its
commitment to reducing delay in expedited cases by requiring a
0 3
trial date to be set within one year of the filing of the complaint.1
In the Eastern District, the use of mandatory nonbinding arbitration in cases under $100,000 means that such cases will be expeditiously directed to a nonfinal determination, which may only be
appealed if the loser is prepared to risk responsibility for the arbitrator's fees.' 04 Both plans thus address the concern of many liti96 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 4.
97 SDNY GuiDE, supra note 79, at 3.
98 SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 4; see Diane E. Murphy, The Concerns ofFederal

Judges, 74 JUDICATURE 112 (1990). Murphy states, in opposition to the setting of firm
trial dates, that "[t]he requirement that trials are to occur within 18 months, absent
special certification, establishes an expectation that cannot be fulfilled at the present
time in many districts, primarily due to the volume and length of criminal trials." Id.
at 114. Further, setting impossible targets, she states, could "thereby mislead litigants, the bar and the public." Id.
99 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 2 (adopting "no revision" of present system).
100 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 2-3 (determining special treatment "according to
the needs of the particular case").
101 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 2-3; see infra notes 165-66 and accompanying
text.
102 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 3-4.
103 SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 2.
104 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 15. It should be noted, however, that a party will
not be liable for arbitrators' fees if permission was granted in forma pauperis.Id.
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gants in smaller cases that the price of justice often exceeds the
value of the suit. By offering new approaches to smaller cases, the
plans attempt meaningful reform. 10 5
Both the SDNY and EDNY Plans adopt vigorous use of case
management conferences. Under the SDNY Plan, in all cases an
initial pretrial conference must be held within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. 10 6 For an expedited case, the conference will
involve the automatic production of relevant documents, the limitation of discovery procedures, and the establishment of a trial
date.1 0 7 For any standard or complex case, the SDNY Plan requires the preparation of a case management plan that delineates
the issues and includes a schedule of pretrial conferences and discovery.' 08 It also encourages subsequent, systematic conferences
as the court deems necessary.' 0 9 In the event that a standard or
complex case has not been tried within eighteen months, a case
management conference should be held to set dates for completion
of discovery and trial." 0
The EDNY Plan mandates both an initial case management
conference and a final pretrial conference."' The court also has
112
discretion to schedule interim pretrial conferences as needed.
In complex cases, the EDNY Plan further requires a status conference every six months.. 3 Although the EDNY Plan sets no firm
a lengthy agenda of issues to
dates for these conferences, it details
1 4
be discussed at such conferences.
105 While the EDNY Plan does not adopt the establishment of a firm trial date as
in the Southern District, it does offer incentives to receive an early and firm trial date
if all parties request or consent to a referral to a magistrate judge. By accepting a
referral to a magistrate judge, litigants will generally receive an earlier trial date
than they might otherwise obtain. EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 21. In addition, under
the EDNY Plan, if a trial-ready case is not reached by the assigned judge after a
reasonable time, but in no event more than six months, the parties may request a
conference with the clerk, who will determine whether another judge may be assigned
on one or two days notice. Id. at 3. The Southern District also has a reassignment
procedure for trial-ready cases. SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 14.
106 SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 2.
107 SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 2.
108 SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 3; see FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26(b).
109 SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 3.
110 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 7.
111 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 10.
112 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 10.
113 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 14 (stating that "[i]n complex cases, it is generally desirable for the court to exercise greater hands-on control of the litigation than
in non-complex cases").
114 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 10-13.
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By utilizing case management to refine the issues in a case
and to set dates for completion of discovery, amendment of pleadings, and motion practice, both the SDNY Plan and the EDNY
Plan should limit some of the potential sources of delay in litigation. 115 Even if counsel and client must undertake substantial
preparation to address the issues to be discussed at these conferences, the possible resolution of various issues without the expense and delay of motion practice should prove extremely beneficial to the client.
Moreover, the continued substantial use of magistrate judges,
which is contemplated by both plans,1 1 may help ensure the productivity of pretrial conferences. Magistrate judges frequently
have more time, and in some cases, more patience and greater inclination than district judges, to devote the painstaking attention
to detail which is often necessary to make pretrial conferences
successful. 1 1 7 Under both plans, magistrate judges may be assigned to develop case management plans and supervise pretrial
activity, as well as engage in other activities designed to expedite
18
litigation.1
B. Automatic Disclosure and Limitations on Discovery
A central tenet of CJRA reform is that litigants should not
devote time and money to excessive and expensive pretrial practice." 9 As set forth above, a case management conference can be
used to develop, either consensually or by judicial direction, a reasonable discovery program. 20 In addition, the SDNY Plan and
115 See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 25, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C-.N. at

6828. The Judiciary Committee cited an interim report which found that jurisdictions
participating in pilot programs with case management controls "have experienced a
significant reduction in processing time for cases included in the program and have
increased court efficiency, as evidenced by their disposition of a greater number of
cases in a shorter period of time without increased resources." Id.
116 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 1-2; SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 3.
117 EDNY FINA REPORT, supra note 77, at 249-50 (recommending increased use
of magistrate judges to alleviate time pressures on district judges).
11s EDNY STANDING ORDER ON EFFEcTSvE DIscOVERY IN CIVIL CASEs No. 4; SDNY
PLAN, supra note 12, at 3.
119 See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 4, at 20-22, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

6823. The Judiciary Committee identified discovery abuses as a principal cause of
high litigation costs and noted that in many cases, economics and not the merits of

the case, govern discovery decisions. Id.
120 See EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 10-14; SDNY GuIDE, supra note 79, at 5-7;
SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 3.
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the EDNY Plan impose some voluntary disclosure rules and place
12 1
limits on certain discovery practices.
The SDNY Plan mandates automatic disclosure of all documents relevant to the subject matter of the pleadings in any case
that is designated as "expedited."1 22 Within twenty-one days of
such designation, the plaintiff must serve the defendant with copies of all documents relevant to the subject matter of the complaint.1 23 Within twenty-one days of receiving this material, the
defendant must serve the plaintiff with all documents that are relevant to the subject matter of the answer.' 24 A document is relevant if it supports, contradicts, or otherwise makes less probable
the material averments of the pleading.' 2 5 Although the SDNY
Plan states that discovery will be limited in expedited cases, it
does not articulate any limitations. 2 6 In standard and complex
cases, the case management conference is coordinated with the requirement of mandatory disclosure. At the conference, the parties
may be required to identify persons with knowledge
of the dispute
127
and those in possession of relevant documents.
Under the EDNY Plan, certain disclosure is required in all
civil cases filed on or after February 1, 1992, except social security, habeas corpus, pro se, and certain civil rights cases.'
Within
thirty days after service of the answer or a written demand, a
party must disclose: (1) the identity of persons with information
concerning the claims, defenses, and damages, (2) a general description of all documents in the party's custody and control that
bear on claims and defenses, and (3) documents that were used to
prepare pleadings or are expected to be used to support the allegations of the pleading. 12 9 In addition, authorizations to obtain
medical, hospital, no-fault, and workers' compensation records
must be provided, as well as the contents of any insurance agreement. 13 0 In addition to these mandatory disclosures, the EDNY
Plan limits, in the absence of an agreement among the parties or a
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 4-7; SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 2-3.
SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 11.
SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 11.
SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 11.
SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 11.
See SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 2.
SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 3.
EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 4-5.
EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 4-5.
EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 4-5.
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court order, the number of interrogatories to fifteen per side and
13 1
the number of depositions to ten per side.
It is difficult to predict how automatic disclosure as envisioned in the SDNY and EDNY Plans will ultimately affect clients. As discussed in subpart I(C) above, voluntary disclosure
presents many difficult problems, particularly where there- are
genuine differences among counsel as to the nature of the dispute
or the significance of a document. In addition, the required disclosure of information that counsel believes supports or contradicts a
claim may provide opposing counsel with a "roadmap" to counsel's
strategy in2 a case, thus bearing upon the attorney work product
13
privilege.

Notwithstanding the difficult issues raised by automatic "voluntary" disclosure, there are several potential benefits from the
use of this disclosure under the SDNY Plan and the EDNY Plan
that may make such experimentation worthwhile. First, the information and documents that counsel must voluntarily provide
could otherwise be routinely obtained through depositions, interrogatories, or document requests. 13 3 Opposing counsel generally
can use any one of these devices to determine which documents a
party possesses or relied on in making its allegations. Second, because document requests are broadly interpreted by most federal
judges, the careful crafting of lengthy requests to obtain the same
documents has probably become an over-rated craft, especially for
the gathering of routine documents. 34 Third, the fact that docuEDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 7.
For a discussion of the resistance to various forms of mandatory discovery
disclosure, see Tobias, supra note 59, at 51. According to Tobias, most of these forms
are modeled on the proposal to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Because of
this they pose a difficulty because they would "significantly change traditional notions
of discovery and thus, [are] highly controversial." Id.; see Ralph K. Winter, In Defense
of Discovery Reform, 58 BRooK. L. REV. 263, 267 (1992) (requiring parties to detail
legal theories "might alert adversaries to legal theories they had not considered"); see
also Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rule Makers Should Be Litigators,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15. According to the authors,
revised Rule 26 will, if adopted, require attorneys to disclose, without further request or definition by their opponents, all potential witnesses and all
potentially relevant documents, whether or not supportive of their cause.
What the attorney considers relevant (work product) and what the client
directs the attorney to consider (attorney-client privilege) will have to be
disclosed.
Id.
133 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 30-34.
134 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Supreme Court noted that
"deposition-discovery rules are ... accorded a broad and liberal treatment." Id. at
131
132
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ments must be automatically produced does not mean that counsel's analysis and expected use of the document will also be fully
disclosed. 135 Fourth, automatic disclosure saves the expense of
the initial document requests and part of the expense incurred
when a party utilizes other discovery devices to determine if a particular document exists.136 Finally, some litigants may be compelled to act more diligently at the outset of a litigation in order to
comply with the requirements of automatic disclosure. In some
cases, the need for prompt document production may induce litigants to proceed more thoughtfully even before commencing litigation. Whether the benefits of this "voluntary" disclosure will
outweigh any perceived difficulties should become clearer as a result of the efforts in the Southern and Eastern Districts.
The effect of implementing discovery limitations is less difficult to assess. By placing presumptive limits on the number of
depositions and interrogatories, the EDNY Plan offers important
economies to litigants, as long as the limitations are appropriate
to the case. Thus, provided that the limitations are not inflexibly
applied so as to prevent necessary discovery, a limitation that
forces counsel to identify only deponents who possess essential information or to propound interrogatories that are actually pertinent to the issues in the case will reduce the excessive use of depositions and interrogatories. Needless discovery is valueless to the
client, and any mechanism that avoids such abusive discovery
should be welcomed.
Another potential benefit of discovery limitations is that they
can help promote clear thinking about a case from the outset. If
interrogatories and document requests are viewed as isolated
events in the litigation process that can be endlessly supple507. "[Tlhe time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition,'"-common from opponents of
lengthy and duplicative document requests-should not "serve to preclude a party
from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case." Id. See generally Nalco
Chem. Co. v. Hydro Techs., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1187 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (interpreting "relevancy" concept liberally).
135 See Winter, supra note 132, at 270. For example, the proposed amendment to
Federal Rule 26 clearly states that work product and privileged materials need not be
automatically disclosed. Id.
136 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b) ("The request shall ... describe each item and
category with reasonable particularity."); see also Winter, supra note 132, at 276
("[G]iven the fact that the costs avoided by automatic disclosure are unnecessary but
may be sufficient to prevent the litigation of some meritorious claims, the proposed
amendments decrease costs while increasing the accuracy and even-handedness of
the system.").
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mented, counsel may fail to define the real issues in a case before
serving such documents. By limiting the availability of these devices, the EDNY Plan will encourage counsel to make hard choices
about where to expend its permitted discovery.
C. Motion Practice
The EDNY Plan and the SDNY Plan adopt significant provisions that should ease the delay caused by motion practice and
thereby benefit clients. Under the SDNY Plan, when a motion is
not decided within sixty days of submission, the judge or magistrate judge shall report the motion and a quarterly report showing
all such undecided motions shall be circulated to all members of
the court. 1 3 7 Under the EDNY Plan, when a motion is not decided
within six months, the clerk's office will contact the judge's chambers to ascertain the status of the motion, report its findings to the
at three-month intervals
parties, and contact chambers thereafter
138
to learn the status of the motion.
Invariably, some judges may regard these provisions as somewhat offensive and unduly regimented and mechanical.' 3 9 On the
other hand, clients have a legitimate interest in prompt dispositions of disputes. 4 ° We think that the EDNY Plan, with its periodic scrutiny of the disposition of motions, is particularly responsive to the concerns that clients and lawyers often have when a
judge has unduly delayed a decision. Although one or more of the
parties may be inclined to request that the court decide the matter
without further delay, they are often hesitant to do so for fear that
any annoyance the request may generate may be translated into
an adverse ruling. By establishing a mechanical and automatic
procedure to manage such delays through the clerk's office, the
137 SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 8.
138 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 9; see CJRA REPORT, DIST. OF KAN., supra note 3
(similar plan).
139 See Mullenix, supra note 8, at 412. Representatives of the Judicial Conference
of the United States Courts opposed the passage of the CJRA as an "unprecedented
congressional intrusion into judicial rulemaking prerogatives." Id. Judge Aubrey E.
Robinson testified before the Senate that the CJRA is "extraordinarily intrusive into
the internal workings of the Judicial Branch. These are procedural matters which
should be handled through the normal, Congressionally-mandated Rules Enabling
Act process." Hearings,supra note 45, at 221.
140 See John R. Setear, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and
Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352, 354 (1982); see also R. Lawrence Dessem, JudicialReporting
Under the Civil JusticeReform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases, 54 U. PrTr. L. REV. 687, 714
(1993) ("The public has the right to demand accountability from its officials, especially
those with life tenure.").
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Eastern District will avoid possible prejudice and have the opportunity to resolve these situations more effectively and fairly.
Both the SDNY Plan and the EDNY Plan contemplate the use
141
of pre-motion conferences to reduce the need for motions.
Under the SDNY Plan, potential motions should be considered at
the case management conference for standard and complex
cases 142 and by judges in all cases where advisable. 43 In addition, discovery disputes in the Southern District should be resolved either by oral motion or letter brief.'
In the Eastern District, any party wishing to make a motion shall notify the court
and the court shall hold a pre-motion conference within four
weeks.1 45 If the court fails to hold a conference, the motion may be
made.' 4 6 Letter submissions shall be used for discovery motions,
147
as well as motions that are procedural in nature.
Although we recognize the economies of pre-motion conferences, we offer one caveat. At times, judges, in an effort to expedite the judicial process, decide matters too quickly in pre-motion
conferences. Judges may direct or strongly urge counsel not to
make a motion where counsel has not had an opportunity to make
a full presentation of the merits of the motion. Frequently, the
problem is not the fault of the court, rather counsel may be inadequately prepared during the pretrial conference to articulate the
merits of the proposed motion or counsel may simply be unpersuasive. Acknowledging the efficiencies which pre-motion conferences are designed to achieve, we nevertheless urge that courts
must be careful not to be unduly precipitous during them. In
some instances, counsel should be permitted to make motions if
they strongly believe that the motions will be successful even if
the court has substantial doubts.
141 EDNY PLAN, supranote 3, at 9; SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 4. See generally
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, Overview of the Southern and EasternDistrict
Civil Justice Reduction Plan, in TAKING SUCCESSFUL DEPOSITIONS IN COMMERCIAL
CASES, at 95, 102-03 (PLI Litig. and Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
437, 1992), availablein WESTLAW, JLR Database (discussing motion practice under
respective plans).
142 SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 3.
143 SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 7; see Civil Justice and Expense and Reduction
Plan, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE, at 805, 807 (PLI Litig. and
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 431, 1992), available in WESTLAW,
JLR Database (discussing advisory group findings regarding pre-motion conferences).
144 SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 5.
145 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 9.
146 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 9.
147 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 10.
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D. Encouragement of ADR
Perhaps the most exciting development under both the SDNY
Plan and the EDNY Plan is the increasingly active use of ADR
mechanisms. 148 Under the SDNY Plan, a two-year program of
court-annexed mediation is mandatory for all expedited cases, as
148 See Jethro I, Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 424, 425 (1986). Alternative dispute
resolution has gained widespread recognition and use in the last 16 years. It has been
defined as:
a set of practices and techniques that aim (1) to permit legal disputes to be
resolved outside the courts for the benefit of the disputants; (2) to reduce the
cost of conventional litigation and the delays to which it is ordinarily subject;
or (3) to prevent legal disputes that would otherwise likely be brought to the
courts.
Id. at 425-26.
ADR was designed to lower the cost, time, and overall drain on the courts, the
parties, and the corporate world. See Eric D. Green et al., Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternative Approach, 11 Loy. L A. L. REV. 493, 494 (1978). Because ADR
procedures are flexible and crafted by the parties themselves, they are generally
speedier, more efficient, and more convenient. See Joseph T. McLaughlin, Alternate
Dispute Resolution, in TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL PRACTICE, AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION
TECHNIQUES IN TE FEDERAL COURTS 1993, at 335 (ALI-ABA, 1993), available in
WESTLAW, JLR Database. But see Dayton, supra note 12, at 907-14 (disputing perception that ADR is more cost efficient since empirical data lacking).
The Executive Branch has also endorsed the expanded use of ADR in civil disputes. In President Bush's "Agenda for Civil Justice Reform," the Council on Competitiveness made five ADR-related recommendations:
(1) Create a "multi-door courthouse" to permit the parties to choose between
several different methods for resolving their dispute. Before the contest
would be set for trial, the parties would attend a mandatory conference to
identify the areas in controversy. At this conference the parties would be
given the opportunity to resolve their claims through a variety of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms, including early neutral evaluation, mediation, arbitration, minitrial, and summary jury trial.
(2) Members of the legal, business, and government communities should advocate dispute resolution techniques as an alternative to litigation.
(3) In most cases, the right to sue should be conditioned on a showing that
the parties have attempted, and failed, to resolve their dispute. The party
alleging harm would be required to prove that it gave timely notice of the
grievance prior to filing the suit, except where emergency or other circumstances require immediate resort to the courts without prior notice to the
opposing party.
(4) Both parties should be encouraged to evaluate their claims closely and
attempt to settle their dispute. Settlement offers advanced prior to trial
should be reinforced with financial incentives such as requiring that the
party who rejected the compromise bear the additional costs of trial unless
the outcome at trial exceeds the settlement offer.
(5) Once a lawsuit has been filed, the parties should be required to attend
regular conferences to discuss settlement.
PREsIDEr's CoUNCIL ON CorNirTrnvsEss, AGENDA FOR CIVaL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AmRICA 15-16 (1991)
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well as a sampling of other civil cases that involve only monetary
damages. 1 49 The court is required to establish a pool of voluntary
mediators to conduct the mediation. 150 Neither the EDNY Plan
nor the SDNY Plan requires a fee for the services of the
mediators.' 5 1 As set forth in the SDNY Plan, the mediator will
direct settlement discussions, but will not evaluate the merits of a
and
case.' 52 At the initial case management conference, the judge
15 3
counsel will discuss whether any issue should be mediated.
Mediators for a case are chosen at random and hold mediation
conferences no later than 150 days after the filing of the last responsive pleading. 15 4 At least seven days before the mediation,
the parties shall provide the mediator with copies of their pleadings and a memorandum, not exceeding ten pages, setting forth
their contentions as to both liability and damages. 5 5 Upon consent, copies of the statement may be served on all parties. 5 6 No
statement from the mediation session may later be offered as evi157
dence or made known to the judge.
The mediator has the discretion to schedule additional conferences with the consent of the parties,15 8 and may require the presence of representatives of the parties at a mediation session. 5 9 In
149 See SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 14; SDNY PLAN, supra note 12, at 5.
Court-annexed arbitration is the most utilized form of mandatory ADR currently in
practice in the federal courts. See Dayton, supra note 12, at 902. At least ten federal
district courts employ some form of mandatory, court-annexed arbitration: Northern
District of California, Middle District of Florida, Western District of Michigan, Western District of Missouri, District of New Jersey, Eastern District of New York, Middle
District of North Carolina, Western District of Oklahoma, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Western District of Texas.
150 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 15-16.
151 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 17; SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 15-16; see
CJRA REPORT, E. DIsT. OF PA., supranote 3, at 37-38 (no mandatory compensation for
mediators). The Eastern District's Plan defines mediation as "'pro bono' in the interest of providing litigants with a speedier and less expensive alternative to the burdens
of discovery and a court room trial." Id. at 38.
152 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 15.
153 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 16.
154 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 16.
155 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 17.
156 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 17.
157 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 18. The EDNY Plan also mandates such a
prohibition. See EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 39. "All proceedings at any mediation
conference authorized by this Rule... shall not be reported, recorded, placed in evidence, made known to the trial court or jury, or construed for any purpose as an admission." Id.
158 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 17.
159 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 17.
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the event the mediation effort does not result in settlement, the
mediator may explore with counsel the possible use of other ADR
methods.16 0 Furthermore, the SDNY Plan calls for the compilation of records concerning mediated settlements as well as the creation of a16comparative
control group to test the effectiveness of the
1
program.

The EDNY Plan envisions the use of several ADR type mechanisms. Similar to the Southern District, the EDNY Plan establishes a program of court-annexed mediation for all civil cases
filed on or after June 30, 1992.162 This program, which makes use

of volunteer mediators, is optional for litigants and is experimental.16 3 1 64The program's effectiveness will be periodically
evaluated.
The EDNY Plan continues the Local Arbitration Rule 1 6 5 re-

quiring that all claims for monetary damages of $100,000 or less
be referred to mandatory arbitration, except for social security,
tax, constitutional, and prisoners' rights cases. 6 If a party then
favorable result,
seeks a trial de novo and does not obtain a more
1 67
fees.
arbitrator's
the
for
liable
is
that party
160 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 19. Other ADR methods include summary
jury trials and early neutral evaluation. See Dayton, supra note 12, at 894-900. The
summary jury trial is a method to reduce the number of civil cases that go to trial. Id.
at 894. Through this procedure, cases ready for trial are scheduled for a half-day
mini-trial before a panel of six jurors. Id. It allows the litigants to view their cases in
front of an impartial panel and encourages settlement based on the verdict. Id. at
894-95. Early neutral evaluation resembles mediation as the case is evaluated in advance by a neutral party based on written statements prepared by the attorneys addressing factual, legal, and procedural issues that are in issue. Overall, however, it is
a less formal procedure than mediation. Id. at 898-900.
161 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 79, at 19.
162 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 17.
163 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 17. The Eastern District provision for courtannexed mediation is optional, perhaps because, unlike the Southern District provision, the services of the mediator are not free. Id.
164 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 17.
165 Local Arbitration Rule of the Eastern District of New York § 3A. The Local
Rule, first promulgated in 1986, is authorized by Judicial Improvements and Access
to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 901(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4659 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 652). The rule was included in a pilot program designed to explore
whether mandatory, nonbinding arbitration encourages quick, less costly, and less
formal resolution of civil cases. See H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-33
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5991. See generally Ritzer v. National
Org. of Indus. Trade Unions, 807 F. Supp. 257, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (analyzing permissible scope of EDNY court-annexed arbitration).
166 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 15.
167 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 15. However, if permission was granted to proceed in forma pauperis, the party will not be responsible for arbitrator's fees. Id.
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Finally, the EDNY Plan creates a neutral evaluation program
for civil cases filed on or after June 30, 1992.168 The neutral
evaluator, an expert in the type of case assigned, will help the parties identify issues, explore settlement, assist in creating a discovery plan, and where appropriate, offer a nonbinding evaluation of
the case.'

69

However they are characterized, these ADR mechanisms offer
the parties an opportunity to resolve their dispute outside the
boundaries of traditional litigation.'7 0 The mechanisms, whether
under the guidance of a mediator, arbitrator, or neutral evaluator,
allow parties to focus and refine the issues in dispute and are,
thus, beneficial to all concerned. Both the SDNY Plan and the
EDNY Plan provide opportunities for litigants to reach such an
alternative resolution.
III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that the CJRA reforms are helpful to a client, there
are a few basic steps that counsel and client are advised to take in
any case. First, at the outset, counsel and client should review the
expense and delay reduction plan in the district in which the action is pending to determine the aspects of the plan that are either
beneficial or detrimental to the client's case. In the case of a
plaintiff with a choice of forum, the relevant plan may be a factor
in forum selection.
Second, counsel and client should carefully prepare for the
case management conference. An effort should be made to prepare for a review of each of the potential issues at such a conference as set forth in Federal Rules 16 and 26(f). By doing so, counsel and client will ensure that the time necessary to resolve these
issues, and the resulting expense, will be minimized.
168 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 15-16.
169 EDNY PLAN, supra note 3, at 15-16; see David A. Rammelt, "InherentPower"
and Rule 16: How FarCan a FederalCourt Push the Litigation Towards Settlement?,

65 IND. L.J. 965 (1990); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text. One advantage
of court-annexed arbitration is that the parties, from the time of filing suit, are on

notice that the case will be subject to arbitration, thereby allowing the parties to plan
their discovery and case preparation accordingly. Rammelt, supra, at 993.
170 McLaughlin, supra note 148, at 367. Proposed changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure also view ADR as an alternative to litigation. Id. The proposed
changes to Rule 16(c)(a) contemplate that "'the use of special procedures to assist in
resolving the dispute' is an appropriate topic for discussion at pretrial conferences."
Id.
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Third, counsel and client may especially benefit from the consideration of available ADR mechanisms that are included in
many CJRA expense and delay reduction plans. While there will
continue to be cases where neither settlement nor ADR is possible,
the systematic use of ADR mechanisms may prove productive by
proposing solutions that attempt to accommodate the complex
needs of the parties.'17 Counsel and client are well advised to at
least consider the ADR methods that are available in the district.
In view of the potential savings of time and money and the basic
reality that most civil litigations are ultimately resolved before
trial, it is useful for counsel and client to review these possibilities
on an ongoing basis.
Finally, as in any program of litigation management, counsel
and client should carefully budget the case in advance. The costs
for compliance with the applicable provisions of an expense and
delay reduction plan must be carefully considered to ensure that
clients participate in the expense and delay reduction efforts relevant to the case. Moreover, it is only by monitoring the results of
expense and delay reduction efforts that a client's voice will remain a meaningful part of the expense and delay reduction discussions that are currently taking place throughout the nation.

171 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, PursuingSettlement in an Adversary Culture:A
Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 12 (1991).

